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Security · REMOTE ACCESS SECURITY

Is Remote Desktop Safe for a Dental Office? RDP, Vendor Remote Tools and How Practices Get Breached

The cyber-insurance renewal has a line asking you to confirm that remote desktop is not open to the internet, and nobody in the office knows the answer. The imaging company wants to leave its support tool running "so we can help faster". The front desk lead asks whether she can confirm appointments from home on Saturday. And this summer a Texas dental group reported that attackers had gone after its remote desktop web services. Is any of this safe?

This guide gives you a plain verdict on "is RDP secure?", the four ways practices get broken into through remote access, a register for every remote door into your office, eight controls to check this week, safe patterns for working from home, and the questions to put to your IT provider. It goes deeper than the short checklist in our guide to remote vs onsite dental IT support, and it sits alongside the wider dental cybersecurity checklist. It covers prevention only.

In this guide
  1. Is RDP secure?
  2. How do dental practices get breached through remote access?
  3. Every remote door into a dental office: build your remote-access register
  4. The controls to check this week
  5. VPN, RD Gateway or a remote-support tool: which should a practice use?
  6. Can staff and doctors work from home safely?
  7. What to ask your IT provider about remote access
  8. How Legend Networking can help
  9. Frequently asked questions
  10. The bottom line

Is RDP secure?

RDP encrypts the session and can be run safely. The danger is exposure: a remote desktop port or portal anyone on the internet can reach and try passwords against. Kept inside the office network, or behind a gateway or VPN demanding multifactor sign-in, with named accounts and logging, RDP is a reasonable tool. Left open, it is a standing invitation.

Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) is the Microsoft protocol that lets one Windows computer show and control the desktop of another over a network. Two related Windows Server pieces turn up in dental offices that have a server, and Microsoft's own documentation describes them this way (Remote Desktop Services overview, updated 30 October 2025):

    • RD Web Access "provides a web portal and feeds … listing desktops and apps users are authorized to use". In plain terms, it is a web page where staff sign in to open the practice software remotely.
    • RD Gateway "enables secure, encrypted RDP access over HTTPS (TCP 443) from external networks without opening internal RDP ports" and "supports MFA and conditional policies". It is the front door that sits between the internet and the remote desktop servers.

The federal guidance is direct. The #StopRansomware Guide from CISA and its partners (September 2023) says: "Do not expose services, such as remote desktop protocol, on the web." It also says "Limit the use of RDP and other remote desktop services," and notes that "threat actors often gain initial access to a network through exposed and poorly secured remote services." So the honest answer to "is remote desktop secure?" is: the protocol can be, a careless setup is not, and the difference is in how it is reached.

How exposed is your setup?

SetupReachable from the internet?What an attacker needsVerdict
RDP port forwarded straight through the office firewall to a server or PCYes, by anyone who scans for itA working username and passwordNot acceptable; close it
RD Web Access portal on the internet, password onlyYesA phished or reused passwordHigh risk; add MFA or take it offline
RD Gateway in front of the servers, MFA requiredThe gateway onlyA password and the second factor, on a patched gatewayReasonable when patched and logged
VPN with MFA, then RDP inside the networkThe VPN onlyA password and the second factor, on a patched VPNReasonable when patched and logged
RDP used only between computers inside the officeNoSomeone already inside the networkAcceptable; still use named accounts
A vendor's cloud remote-support tool left running all the timeThrough the vendor's cloud serviceThe vendor's account, or a staff member talked into a sessionDepends on approval, MFA and logs (see the register below)

Two Windows settings worth knowing

Microsoft's guide to enabling Remote Desktop on a PC (updated 18 June 2025) makes two points that matter in a practice. First, "Enabling Remote Desktop opens a port on your PC," and "if you only need to use your PC locally, there's no need to enable Remote Desktop." Front-desk and operatory computers rarely need it switched on. Second, Network Level Authentication (NLA) means "users must authenticate themselves before a remote session is established"; Microsoft recommends keeping it on. NLA is a floor, not a substitute for MFA or for keeping the port off the internet.

How do dental practices get breached through remote access?

Most remote-access break-ins at small practices follow one of four patterns: a remote desktop service or portal reachable from the internet, an old vendor or staff account that still works, a remote-support tool nobody approved, or a caller who talks someone into starting a session. Each has a checkable fix, so an inventory comes before any new product.

Pattern 1

An exposed door

A remote desktop port or web portal answers anyone on the internet. Automated tools try stolen and common passwords around the clock until one works.

Pattern 2

A key nobody took back

A former employee, a past IT company or a vendor still has a working account. Nobody notices because nobody is looking at that account.

Pattern 3

A tool nobody approved

A remote-support program installed for one job years ago is still running. Security tools often treat it as normal software.

Pattern 4

A convincing caller

Someone posing as a vendor or IT asks a staff member to start a session "for an update". The staff member opens the door from the inside.

Pattern 1: remote desktop or a remote-desktop web portal on the internet

This is the pattern CISA's guide names first. A practice opens remote desktop so the owner can check schedules from home, a consultant sets up a web portal during a busy year, and the door stays open long after anyone remembers it. Because it answers anyone, it gets probed constantly. If the only thing standing between the internet and your patient database is one password, a reused or phished password is enough.

Pattern 2: an account that should have been switched off

Remote access depends on accounts, and accounts outlive the people who used them. The former office manager, the IT company you left two years ago, the imaging vendor's engineer who set up the sensors: if any of those logins still works, it is a door with a known key. CISA's Guide to Securing Remote Access Software (6 June 2023) recommends that organisations "audit Active Directory for inactive and obsolete accounts", and the same applies to the accounts inside each remote tool.

Pattern 3: a remote-support tool nobody approved

Dental offices collect remote-support programs: one for the IT provider, one from the practice-software vendor, one the imaging company installed, one a billing service asked for. The problem, in the guide's words, is that because these tools are used for legitimate purposes, "its use is frequently not flagged as malicious by security tools or processes." An earlier advisory, AA23-025A (25 January 2023, CISA, NSA and MS-ISAC), described criminals who "sent help desk-themed phishing emails" and then ran legitimate remote tools as portable programs, "effectively bypassing common software controls." The fix is a short approved list and blocking everything else.

Pattern 4: the caller who wants a session

The fourth pattern needs no technical weakness at all. A caller says they are from the practice-software or imaging vendor, or from "IT", and needs to connect today to push an update or fix an error. Once a staff member starts the session, the caller is inside. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center recorded 47,794 tech-support scam complaints and $2,134,675,818 in reported losses in 2025 (2025 Internet Crime Report). Those figures cover every kind of victim, not only businesses, but the script is the same one used on a front desk. The defence is a rule, not software: never start a session for an inbound caller; hang up and call your IT provider on the number you already have.

A Texas example: Soniva Dental Care (2026)

On 29 July 2026, HIPAA Journal reported a data breach at Soniva Dental Care, a San Antonio–headquartered dental group with 14 locations (HIPAA Journal). According to the report, "On May 26, 2026, Soniva Dental Care was informed by its IT support company about suspicious remote access sessions," and the group found that "its remote desktop web services infrastructure was under attack." Its response included "disabling accounts with remote desktop access." The Texas Attorney General was told that "up to 30,000 Texas residents were potentially affected."

Two details are worth noticing. The warning reached the practice from its IT support company, which reported suspicious remote sessions, and the response centred on the accounts that had remote desktop access. HIPAA Journal's report doesn't say how the attackers first got in beyond the remote desktop web services, and this guide doesn't speculate. Practices in the same market reviewing their own setup can see how support works locally on our page about dental IT in San Antonio.

Every remote door into a dental office: build your remote-access register

A remote-access register is a list of every way someone outside the building can reach your computers: who, with which tool, always on or on request, and whether it has MFA, a named account and a log. Most practices that build one find a door they had forgotten. Print the template below and fill it in with your IT provider.

Remote doorTypical methodAlways on or on request?MFA?Named account?Logged?BAA on file?Owner in the practice
IT provider's management agentRemote monitoring and management (RMM) agent on every computerAlways on (monitoring)
Practice-management software vendor supportVendor's remote-support tool, started for a ticketShould be on request
Imaging vendor support (sensors, pan/CBCT, imaging software)Vendor's own tool, sometimes left installedShould be on request
Phone or VoIP vendorWeb portal; occasionally a support sessionOn request
Billing or revenue-cycle companyRemote login to the practice softwareScheduled; review often
Cloud backup consoleVendor web consoleAlways reachable; MFA essential
Staff working from homeVPN or RD Gateway, then the practice softwareScheduled hours
Doctor reaching the practice software from homeVPN, RD Gateway or a cloud loginAs needed
Links between locationsSite-to-site VPN between officesAlways on

How to fill it in

    1. Start with what is installed. Ask your IT provider for a list of every remote-access program on every practice computer and server. CISA recommends that organisations "audit remote access software and their configurations on devices on your network."
    1. Add what is reachable. Ask for the result of an external scan of your office's internet address, showing which services answer from outside.
    1. Add every outside company. Go through the vendors you pay: software, imaging, phones, billing, backup, labs with portal access. Ask each how they connect and under whose account.
    1. Mark each row. For every door, record the method, whether it is on request, whether MFA is enforced, whether the account belongs to one named person, and where the log lives.
    1. Name an owner. Somebody in the practice, usually the office manager, approves changes to the register and reviews it each quarter.

The "BAA on file?" column is a reminder, not a reading of the law. Vendors that can reach patient information usually raise the question of a business associate agreement; your compliance adviser or attorney decides which agreements you need and what they say.

Once the register exists, every other control on this page becomes a yes-or-no question about a row. That is also the point where outside help is most useful: our dental cybersecurity services page describes how a security review fits around this kind of inventory.

The controls to check this week

Eight checks cover most of the remote-access risk in a typical practice: nothing exposed, one approved tool, MFA on every path, named accounts, approved vendor sessions, logs that someone reads, same-day removal of leavers, and the gateway patched first. None needs new software to verify; each is a question your IT provider can answer in writing.

Remote-access controls to check this week

  1. 1Confirm nothing is exposedStep 1Ask IT for the external scan result and confirm no remote desktop port or RD Web portal answers from the internet without a gateway or VPN and MFA in front.
  2. 2Keep one approved remote-support toolStep 2Name the approved tool in writing; remove or block the others, as CISA recommends with allowlisting.
  3. 3Require MFA on every remote pathStep 3VPN, gateway, web portal, backup console and every vendor tool, with no exceptions for the owner.
  4. 4Give everyone a named accountStep 4One account per engineer and per vendor technician; no shared vendor logins or "frontdesk" accounts for remote use.
  5. 5Approve vendor sessions on requestStep 5A named person approves each session, it ends when the job ends, and always-on vendor access is the exception.
  6. 6Keep logs and read themStep 6Session logs show who connected, when, to which computer; someone reviews them on a schedule.
  7. 7Remove access the day someone leavesStep 7Staff, vendors and former IT providers lose remote access on their last day, not at the next audit.
  8. 8Patch the front door firstStep 8The VPN, RD Gateway and remote-access servers get security updates before anything else.

1. Confirm no remote desktop or RD Web portal is reachable from the internet

Don't rely on memory. Ask your IT provider for the external scan of your office's public internet address and a one-line statement of what it found. If a remote desktop port answers, or an RD Web Access page loads from outside with only a password, that is the first thing to fix. This is also the evidence your insurer is asking about.

2. One approved remote-support tool; remove or block the rest

Pick the tool your IT provider uses, write its name in the register, and ask for every other remote-support program to be uninstalled or blocked. CISA's guide recommends application controls "including allowlisting RMM programs." When a vendor needs a session, they work through the approved route or an on-request session you start, not through software of their own left running.

3. MFA on every remote path

Every door in the register should ask for a second factor: the VPN, the gateway, the web portal, the backup console and each vendor's account. The #StopRansomware Guide says to "implement MFA on all VPN connections." Choosing and rolling out MFA methods is covered in our guide to MFA for every remote path; here the only question is whether any door is missing it.

4. Named accounts for every engineer and vendor

Each person who connects gets an account in their own name. Shared logins such as "support" or "vendor1" make it impossible to tell who did what, and impossible to remove one person without disrupting everyone. The same rule applies inside the remote-support tool itself, not only in Windows.

5. Vendor sessions on request, approved by a named person

Always-on vendor access is convenient for the vendor. On-request sessions, approved by the office manager or the IT provider and ended after the job, are safer for the practice. Write down who may approve, and how a vendor asks: through a ticket or a call to IT, never through a cold call to the front desk.

6. Session logs kept and reviewed

A log nobody reads is a record, not a control. Ask where remote-session logs are kept, how long they are kept, and who reviews them. CISA's guide asks customers of IT providers to make sure contracts give them visibility of "logging activities, including provider's presence, activities, and connections to the customer networks."

7. Remove access the day a vendor or employee leaves

Offboarding is where Pattern 2 starts. Put remote access on the leaving checklist for staff and vendors, and treat a change of IT provider the same way: the old provider's agent, accounts and tools come out on the switch-over day. Our guides on how to change IT providers safely and the HIPAA offboarding checklist cover the wider steps.

8. Patch the remote-access gateway or VPN first

Internet-facing systems are the ones attackers reach first, so they get updates first. The #StopRansomware Guide says to "prioritize timely patching of internet-facing servers," and CISA's remote-access guide points to "remote access and management servers and agents." Our guide to dental IT patch management explains how to schedule updates without disrupting clinic hours.

Where the HIPAA Security Rule fits

The HIPAA Security Rule does not mention RDP by name, but several of its standards touch remote access. Quoted from the regulation (45 CFR, via Cornell's Legal Information Institute, read 1 November 2026):

SectionWhat the text says
164.312(b) Audit controls"Implement hardware, software, and/or procedural mechanisms that record and examine activity in information systems that contain or use electronic protected health information."
164.312(d) Person or entity authentication"Implement procedures to verify that a person or entity seeking access to electronic protected health information is the one claimed."
164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C) Termination procedures"Implement procedures for terminating access to electronic protected health information when the employment of" a workforce member or other arrangement ends
164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) Log-in monitoring"Procedures for monitoring log-in attempts and reporting discrepancies."

Whether and how each standard applies to your practice, and what records you keep, is for your compliance adviser or attorney to decide. The register and the eight checks above give them something concrete to review.

VPN, RD Gateway or a remote-support tool: which should a practice use?

Each has a place. A VPN with MFA suits staff who need the whole office network; an RD Gateway with MFA suits staff who only need the practice software; a remote-support tool suits IT and vendors fixing computers. Problems start when all three exist with no list, or when any is reachable with a password alone.

OptionBest forStrengthWatch for
VPN with MFAStaff or doctors who need several office systems; links between locationsNothing inside the office is exposed directly; one front doorA home computer on the VPN is on your network; VPN appliances need prompt patching
RD Gateway with MFA (with or without RD Web Access)Staff who only need the practice software or one desktop on a serverNo internal remote desktop ports opened; access limited to named desktops or appsGateway and web portal must be patched and logged; a portal without MFA is Pattern 1
Remote-support tool (IT provider's or a vendor's)Engineers fixing a specific computerFast for support; can require approval for each sessionSeveral tools on one computer; always-on vendor access; inbound-caller scams
Cloud practice software loginPractices on cloud practice softwareNo office server to exposeMFA and device rules still apply; the cloud account becomes the door

The NIST guide to telework and remote access (SP 800-46 Rev. 2, July 2016) makes a point that still holds: the client devices used for remote access, whether practice-issued or personal, "should be secured against expected threats." The tunnel is only as trustworthy as the computer at the other end.

Can staff and doctors work from home safely?

Yes, if the practice decides how. For server-based practice software, that means a VPN or RD Gateway with MFA, from a practice-managed device, into a named account. For cloud practice software, it means MFA and rules about which devices may sign in. What is not safe is remote desktop opened through the firewall to a personal PC.

Server-based practice software

Dentrix, Eaglesoft and Open Dental in their server-installed forms keep the database on a server in the office, so working from home means reaching that server. Open Dental's own remote access page lists the common routes: remote desktop software such as GoToMyPC or LogMeIn, Windows Remote Desktop, its optional ODTouch and ODMobile eServices for limited access, and taking a copy of the database home on a laptop or removable drive. That last option puts a full copy of patient data outside the building and deserves a hard conversation with your IT provider before anyone tries it. Our Open Dental IT support page covers the server side.

Cloud practice software

Cloud practice software removes the office server from the path, but not the risk. The login page is now the front door. Require MFA for every user, limit which devices may sign in where the software allows it, and remove users on their last day, exactly as you would for a VPN.

Reaching Dentrix from home

Many doctors search for a way to use Dentrix remotely. Classic Dentrix is installed in the office, so a doctor reviewing tomorrow's schedule from home is reaching the office server. The safe pattern is the same as above: a VPN or RD Gateway with MFA, from a practice-managed computer, into the doctor's own named account, with the session logged. Ask your IT provider and Henry Schein One which route your version supports before setting anything up. Our Dentrix IT support page explains how the server, workstations and updates fit together.

Rules for home devices

Before anyone works from home

  • The device is practice-managed, with current updates and security software
  • Access goes through the practice VPN or RD Gateway, never a port opened on the office firewall
  • MFA is required at every sign-in
  • The person uses their own named account, never a shared one
  • No patient files are saved to the home computer or a USB drive
  • The session locks after a few minutes idle and ends when work ends
  • Access hours and the approver are written in the register

Microsoft notes that Windows Home editions "can't serve as Remote Desktop hosts"; they can still connect out. That matters less than the bigger rule: a family computer shared with children is not a safe place to open the practice schedule.

What to ask your IT provider about remote access

The fastest way to learn where you stand is to ask your IT provider eight questions and ask for the answers in writing. A good provider will have most of them ready. The same answers usually go on your cyber-insurance application, so collect them once.

The tools

    • Which remote-access tool do you use, and is it installed on every computer and server we have?
    • What other remote-access programs are on our computers today, and can you remove or block them?

The doors

    • Is any remote desktop port or web portal reachable from the internet, and how do you know? Can we see the last external scan?
    • Is MFA enforced on every remote path, including vendor tools and the backup console?

The people

    • Who on your team can connect to our systems, and does each person have a named account?
    • How are vendor sessions requested and approved, and who ends them?

The evidence

    • Where are remote-session logs kept, for how long, and can we see a sample, including your own team's connections?
    • What happens to remote access the day a staff member, a vendor or a former IT provider leaves?

Insurers ask some of the same things; see the RDP question on cyber-insurance applications for how it is usually worded. If the answers are vague, our article on common HIPAA violations in dental practices shows how a password-only remote desktop tends to surface later.

Remote-access review sheet (print and keep with the register)

  • External scan result received and dated
  • One approved remote-support tool named; others removed or blocked
  • MFA confirmed on VPN, gateway, portals, backup console and vendor tools
  • Every engineer and vendor technician has a named account
  • Vendor-session approval process written down
  • Session-log location, retention and reviewer recorded
  • Leaver steps include remote access for staff, vendors and former IT providers
  • Gateway and VPN patch dates recorded

How Legend Networking can help

Remote access is where a practice depends most on the people at the other end of the connection, so it is fair to ask who they are. At Legend Networking, the work is done by in-house engineers, with no outsourced first-level triage. We bring 22+ years in dental IT, have served over 3,500 practices since 2004, and the service includes 24/7 monitoring. Our helpdesk is staffed 24/7 at 1-800-794-1588, the one general number. We work remote-first nationwide, and onsite dispatch is by appointment across served dental markets.

This guide's author, Ian Lynch, has 22 years in dental IT and oversees the NOC, onsite dispatch and client technology roadmaps. Legend holds a 4.8 rating from 173 Google reviews. Put the eight questions above to us as you would to anyone else; the register works the same whichever company manages your computers.

Questions

Frequently asked questions

Is RDP secure for a dental office?

RDP can be secure in a dental office when it is never reachable directly from the internet, sits behind a VPN or RD Gateway that requires multifactor sign-in, uses a named account for each person, and logs every session. CISA's guidance says not to expose remote desktop on the web. A remote desktop port forwarded through the office firewall is the setup to remove first.

Is remote desktop connection safe for the front desk to use from home?

It can be, through the practice's VPN or RD Gateway with MFA, on a computer the practice manages, into the staff member's own account. It is not safe to open remote desktop on the office firewall so a personal home PC can connect, or to save patient files at home. Agree working hours and who approves home access before anyone starts.

Is a VPN safer than remote desktop?

They do different jobs. A VPN with MFA puts a single protected door in front of the office network, and remote desktop then runs inside it, which is a common and sensible pattern. An RD Gateway with MFA does something similar for remote desktop alone. Either way, the VPN or gateway needs prompt security updates, because it is the part the internet can reach.

Should our imaging or software vendor have permanent remote access?

Usually not. On-request sessions, approved by a named person in the practice or by your IT provider and ended when the job is done, give vendors what they need without leaving a door open all year. If a vendor insists on always-on access, record it in your register with MFA, a named account and logging, and review it each quarter.

How do we know which remote tools are on our computers?

Ask your IT provider for an inventory of every remote-access program on every practice computer and server, plus an external scan of what answers from the internet. CISA recommends auditing remote access software and allowlisting approved tools. Practices that do this for the first time often find an old vendor tool or a forgotten remote desktop setting still active.

What should we do if someone calls asking to connect to our computers?

Don't start the session, even if the caller sounds like your software or imaging vendor and the request seems urgent. Take a name and number, hang up, and call your IT provider on the number you already have. Genuine vendors arrange sessions through a ticket or through IT. Make this a written rule for everyone at the front desk.

Does HIPAA require MFA for remote access?

The current Security Rule requires procedures to verify that a person seeking access to electronic patient information "is the one claimed", but it does not name MFA. A proposed update published on 6 January 2025 would require it, but it is still a proposal; the federal regulatory agenda lists final action for July 2027. See our proposed HIPAA Security Rule update summary and confirm with your compliance adviser.

How do we protect RDP from ransomware?

Prevention comes down to a few steps: never expose remote desktop to the internet, require MFA on the VPN or gateway in front of it, give every user a named account with only the access they need, patch internet-facing systems first, and keep backups that have been restored in a test. For how to test a restore, see dental data backup and recovery.

Is TeamViewer, AnyDesk or a similar tool safe in a dental office?

Remote-support tools like these can be used safely when one approved tool is chosen, every user has a named account with MFA, sessions are approved and logged, and every other remote program is removed. CISA's 2023 guide warns that because these tools are legitimate, their misuse is often not flagged by security software, so an unapproved copy can go unnoticed.

How often should we review remote access?

Review the remote-access register at least each quarter, and also whenever a staff member leaves, a vendor changes, you switch IT providers, or you add a location or a new piece of software. Each review should confirm the external scan is clean, every door still has MFA and a named owner, and nobody has access who no longer needs it.

The bottom line

If the insurance form, the vendor request or the news has you unsure which doors are open, the register on this page is the place to start, and a second pair of eyes helps. Ask for a Free Dental IT Assessment: a review of your computers, software, network security, backups and performance, with written findings and prioritized recommendations. Bring the filled-in register with you. To see how ongoing protection is organised, visit our dental cybersecurity services page.

Ian Lynch
About the author

Ian Lynch

Owner & Operator, Legend Networking

22 years in dental IT. Oversees the NOC, onsite dispatch and client technology roadmaps for practices nationwide.

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